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27 February 2002
George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500
Mr. President,
Our nation is at grave risk of a cyber attack that could devastate the national psyche and
economy more broadly than did the September 11th attack. We, as concerned scientists and
leaders, seek your help and offer ours. The critical infrastructure of the United States,
including electrical power, finance, telecommunications, health care, transportation, water,
defense and the Internet, is highly vulnerable to cyber attack. Fast and resolute mitigating
action is needed to avoid national disaster. We urge you to act immediately by former a
Cyber-Warfare Defense Project modeled in the style of the Manhattan Project.
Consider the following scenario. A terrorist organization announces one morning that they
will shut down the Pacific Northwest electrical power grid for six hours starting at 4:00
PM; they then do so. The same group then announces that they will disable the primary
telecommunication trunk circuits between the U.S. East and West Coasts for a half day;
they then do so, despite our best efforts to defend against them. Then, they threaten to
bring down the air traffic control system supporting New York City, grounding all traffic
and diverting inbound traffic; they then do so. Other threats follow, and are successfully
executed, demonstrating the adversary's capability to attack our critical infrastructure.
Finally, they threaten to cripple e-commerce and credit card service for a week by using
several hundred thousand stolen identities in millions of fraudulent transactions. Their
list of demands is then posted in the New York Times, threatening further actions if their
demands are not met. Imagine the ensuing public panic and chaos. If this scenario were to
unfold, Americans everywhere would feel that our national sovereignty had been compromised;
we would wonder how, as a nation, we could have let this happen.
Mr. President, what makes this scenario both interesting and alarming is that all of the
aforementioned events have already happened, albeit not concurrently nor all by malicious
intent. They occurred as isolated events, spread out over time; some during various technical
failures, some during simple (government-sponsored) exercises, and some during real-world
cyber attacks. All of them, however, could be effected through remote cyber attack by any
adversary who so chooses, whether individual or state-sponsored. The resources required are
modest -- far less than the cost of one army tank. All that is required is a small group of
competent computer scientists, a few inexpensive PCs, and Internet access. Even the smallest
nation-states and terrorist organizations can easily muster such capabilities, let alone
better-organized groups such as Al Qaeda.
Many nations, including Iran and China, for example, have already developed cyber-offense
capabilities that threaten our economy and the economies of our allies.
There is no doubt that such a serious national vulnerability is a real and present danger.
This has been affirmed by a number of distinguished bodies, including the President's
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (1997), the National Academy of Sciences
(Computers at Risk, 1990; Trust in Cyberspace, 1999), and the U.S. Defense Science Board
on Information Warfare Defense (1996, 2000).
The consequence of successfully exploiting these vulnerabilities would be significant damage
to the U.S. economy, degraded public trust with concomitant long-term retardation of economic
growth, degradation in quality of life, and a severe erosion of the public's confidence that
the government can adequately protect their security. We have seen the amplification effects,
on our economy and on public apprehension, from a single event such as the World Trade Center
and Pentagon attacks. Aggregate damages resulting from amateur cyber attacks (e.g., 1998
Internet Worm, Melissa Virus, I-LOVE-YOU virus, Code Red Virus and the Nimda virus) are
estimated to have been $12 billion for the year 2001 alone. Extrapolating from this, a
professionally-executed, coordinated cyber attack on our national critical infrastructure
could easily result in a 100-fold amplification -- 10-fold from being professionally-executed
and another 10-fold from indirect e-commerce suppression effects. In terms of a dollar value,
this could amount to several hundred billion dollars in damage to the U.S. economy. Moreover,
some community experts and reports (such as those cited above) estimate a high probability of
a serious attack on U.S. critical infrastructure within the next few years.
The goal of our proposed Manhattan-style undertaking would be to create a national-scale
cyber-defense policy and capability to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber threats to our
critical infrastructure. We mean Manhattan-style in several senses: national priority,
inclusion of top scientists, focus, scope, investment, and urgency with which a national
capability must be developed. To prevent attacks, we need a coordinated effort to work
with our critical-infrastructure providers in defending their most critical information
systems. To detect attacks, we need to permeate our critical networks with a broad sensor
grid imbued with the capability to detect large-scale attacks by correlating and fusing
seemingly unrelated events that are, in fact, part of a coordinated attack. To respond to
attacks, we need to devise strategies and tactics to pre-plan effective actions in the face
of major cyber-attack scenarios; we need to augment our national infrastructure with
mechanisms that support the defined strategies and tactics when attacks are detected and
verified. We believe that all this can be done with a close partnership between the public
and private sectors while maintaining sensitivity to public concerns about privacy and
fairness, consistent with American values and laws. The result should be a resilient
critical infrastructure that is resistant to cyber attack, plus next-generation technology
which enables our critical infrastructure to be more easily secured. Given private-sector
economic realities, our nation's economy and well-being will continue to rely on the
existing vulnerable infrastructure for the indefinite future, unless strong government
investment leads the way.
The proposed Manhattan-style cyber-defense project will cost a fraction of the expense we
will incur from a single major cyber attack. We estimate the project would require an investment
of $500 million per year initially, and could reach the billion dollar level in the out-years.
The project would run over the course of five years to create a national-scale initial operating
capability no later than year three, and more advanced defensive and offensive capabilities by
year five. We recommend that you appoint a small board of top computer scientists and engineers
to work out the details of a plan, and set the plan in motion within ninety days. The plan
should include an appropriate balance between engineering and focused research to support
the national capability and the policy, laws, and procedures that would be needed to deploy
and support the cyber-defense technology.
The clock is ticking. We look to you, as America's leader, to act on behalf of the nation.
Your conscientious and effective defense of our physical homeland should extend into the
increasingly vital frontier of U.S. cyberspace. We anticipate that the nation will fully
endorse and even expect this forward-thinking and courageous action in the face of such a
major threat to national security. We stand ready to help in any way we can in taking this
very important next step to defend our country.
Very respectfully,
[signed]
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O. Sami Saydjari Founder Cyber Defense Research Center Former Information Assurance Program Manager, DARPA Former Fellow, National Security Agency
Dr. Robert Balzer Chief Technology Officer Teknowledge Corporation
Terry C. Vickers Benzel Vice President of Advanced Security Research Network Associates, Inc.
Thomas A. Berson, Ph.D. Principal Scientist, Palo Alto Research Center Past-President, International Association for Cryptologic Research Past-Chair, IEEE Technical Committee on Security and Privacy
Bob Blakely Chief Scientist, Security and Privacy IBM Tivoli Software
Seymour E. Goodman Professor of International Affairs and Computing Co-Director, Georgia Tech Information Security Center Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. J. Thomas Haigh Chief Technology Officer Secure Computing Corporation
Walter L. Heimerdinger, PhD
Patrick M. Hughes Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired President, PMH Enterprises LLC Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Former Director of Intelligence (J-2), Joint Chiefs of Staff
Stephen T. Kent Chief Scientist -- Information Security BBN Technologies -- A Verizon Company (member of "Computers at Risk" & "Trust in Cyber Space" NRC committees)
Angelos D. Keromytis Assistant Professor, Computer Science Dept. Columbia University
Dr. Marvin J. Langston Deputy Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense, 1998-2001 Director Information Systems Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1997-98 Chief Information Officer, Department of Navy, 1996-1997
Karl N. Levitt Professor of Computer Science Director of the UC David Security Laboratory Department of Computer Science University of California, Davis
Jaisook Rho Principal Computer Scientist Network Associates, Inc.
Dr. Arthur S. Robinson President, System/Technology Development Corporation Formerly Technical Director of RCA R&D for U.S.N. Aegis Weapons Systems
S. Shankar Sastry Professor and Chair, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences Formerly, Director, Information Technology Office, DARPA, US DoD
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Salvatore J. Stolfo Professor of Computer Science Columbia University
Dr. Curtis R. Carlson Chief Executive Officer SRI International
George Cybenko Dorothy and Walter Gramm Professor Thayer School of Engineering Dartmouth College
John C. Davis Director of Information Security Mitretek Systems Inc. Former Commissioner on PCCIP Former Director of NCSC/NSA
Matt Donlon Former Director, Security and Intelligence Office Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Patrick Lincoln Member of Defense Science Board Panels 2000-2001 Director, Computer Science Laboratory SRI International
John H. Lowry Division Engineer Technical Director for Information Security BBN Technologies/Verizon
Stephen J. Lukasik Consultant, Science Applications International Corporation Former Director, Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Former Chief Scientist, Federal Communications Commission
David Luckham Research Professor of Electrical Engineering Stanford University
Dr. Joseph Markowitz
Robert T. Marsh General, USAF (Retired) Former Chairman, President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
Terry Mayfield Institute for Defense Analyses
J.M. McConnell Former Director, National Security Agency
John McHugh, PhD Carnegie Mellon University
Fred B. Schneider Professor of Computer Science and Director of Cornell/AFRL Information Assurance Institute
Gregg Schudel Formerly, Senior Engineer and Manager of Experimentation, DARPA Information Assistance Program
Larry J. Schumann President, EnterpriseTec, Inc. Member of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (1996-2000)
Jonathan M. Smith Professor Computer and Information Science Department University of Pennsylvania
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Roy A. Maxion, Ph.D. Director, Dependable Systems Laboratory Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University
David J. Farber Moore Professor of Telecommunications and Professor of Business and Public Policy University of Pennsylvania
Richard J. Feiertag Manager of Strategic Planning NAI Labs, Security Research Division Network Associates, Inc.
Edward A. Feigenbaum Kumagai Professor of Computer Science Emeritus Stanford University, and Chief Scientist, United States Air Force (1994-97)
Dr. Tiffany M. Frazier Director, Advanced Computing Alphatec, Inc.
Roderick A. Moore Systems Engineer Former National Security Council Staff Pres. Reagan and Pres. Bush Administrations
Dr. Charles L. Moorefield Board Chairman, Alphatech, Inc.
Peter G. Neumann Computer Science Lab SRI International
Dr. Clifford Neuman Sr. Research Scientist and Associate Division Director -- Computer Networks Division Information Sciences Institute University of Southern California
E. Rogers Novak, Jr. Managing Member Novak Biddle Venture Partners
Allen E. Ott Orincon Information Assurance President
Dr. Michael Paige Former Director, Xerox PARC
Dr. Vern Paxson Senior Scientist, International Computer Science Institute Staff Scientist, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories
Phillip A. Porras Program Director System Design Laboratory SRI International
Laura S. Tinnel Deputy Program Manager and Research Scientist Information & Systems Assurance Group Teknowledge Corporation
J. Douglas Tygar Professor of Computer Science and Information Management University of California, Berkeley
J. Kendree Williams Chief Technology Officer Zel Technologies, LLC CDR, USN (Ret)
R. James Woolsey Director of Central Intelligence, 1993-95
Larry T. Wright Chairman, Defense Science Board Task Force on Defensive Information Operations 2000-2001 |
Signed copies of this presidential letter for all individual signers are on file and available for inspection.
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